Signcryption is an asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a low computational and communication overhead. In this paper, we propose realistic security models for signcryption, which give the attacker power to choose both messages/signcryptexts as well as recipient/sender public keys when accessing the signcryption/unsigncryption oracles of attacked entities. We then show that Zheng's original signcryption scheme is secure in our confidentiality model relative to the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem and is secure in our unforgeability model relative to a Gap version of the discrete logarithm problem. All these results are shown in the random oracle model.
Introduction

Motivation
Message confidentiality is one of the most important goals of cryptography, both in the symmetric and asymmetric settings. Over the last decade, in the asymmetric setting, a number of encryption schemes meeting strong confidentiality requirements such as security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks [19, 24] , have emerged. Early constructions of such schemes include Zheng and Seberry's [38] public key encryption schemes, which are efficient but were not proven to be secure against chosen ciphertext attacks "in the reductionist way" (namely, in such a way that presents a reduction from attacking cryptographic schemes to solving well-known computationally-hard problems). Shortly after Zheng and Seberry's proposals, several other schemes [7, 13, 22] were proposed, whose security against chosen ciphertext attacks can be analyzed in the reductionist way under an additional heuristic assumption known as the random oracle model [8] . The first practical scheme that does not depend on the random oracle model was given by Cramer and Shoup [10] and received great attention from the cryptographic community.
Along with message confidentiality, message authenticity is another important goal of cryptography. In the asymmetric setting, this goal was realized by the advent of digital signatures. The essential security requirement for digital signatures is the (existential) unforgeability against * A part of this work was done while the first author was with the School of Network Computing, Monash University (Australia)/the School of Information Technology and Computer Science, the University of Wollongong (Australia) and the second author was with the School of Network Computing, Monash University.
adaptive chosen message attacks [16] , where an attacker is allowed to query a number of messages of his choice to the signing oracle. Note that slight modifications of the classical ElGamal signature [12] and the Schnorr signature [27] schemes were proved [23, 20] to be secure in this sense, that is, (existentially) unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack [16] (in the random oracle model).
A natural question one can now ask is how to integrate encryption and signature schemes in an efficient way without sacrificing each scheme's security, in other words, how to efficiently provide communicating messages with confidentiality and authenticity simultaneously as one cryptographic function. In 1997, Zheng [34] gave a positive answer to the question: He proposed a cryptographic scheme called "signcryption" which integrates the functionality of discrete log based public key encryption and digital signature schemes in a very efficient way. Although Zheng's signcryption scheme has been the focus of a number of research works, no reductionist-style security analysis of Zheng's signcryption, as far as we know, has ever been given. In this paper, we propose precise and realistic security models for generic signcryption schemes and provide rigorous proofs, based on these proposed models, that Zheng's original signcryption scheme meets strong security requirements with respect to message confidentiality and unforgeability under known cryptographic assumptions.
Related Work
Compared with the asymmetric setting, research on the integration of message confidentiality and authenticity was relatively more active in the symmetric setting. A series of research works appeared on using modes of block ciphers to give both message confidentiality and integrity [17, 25] . Also, security issues related to the composition of symmetric key encryption and message authentication code (MAC) were considered by Bellare and Namprepre [6] . They concluded that only "Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM)" composition is generically secure against chosen ciphertext attack and existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack. Krawczyk [18] also considered the same problem when building a secure channel over insecure networks. Interestingly, his conclusion was that the "MAC-then-Encrypt (MtE)" composition is also secure, under the assumption that encryption method is either a secure CBC mode or a stream cipher that XORs the data with a random pad.
In the asymmetric setting, Tsiounis and Yung [33] proposed a variant of the ElGamal encryption scheme where Schnorr's signature is used to provide non-malleability. However, the security goal of their scheme is to provide confidentiality, consequently the strong origin authentication is not supported in their scheme. (Note that this scheme was analyzed again by Schnorr and Jakobsson [28] under the generic model plus the random oracle model. Note also that the security proof of Tsiounis and Yung's scheme given in [33] was later found to be flawed [30] : The Schnorr signature scheme that was used as a "proof of knowledge" in their public key encryption scheme, makes it impossible to efficiently simulate the responses to the chosen ciphertext attacker's decryption queries. We refer readers to [30] for more details.)
The first attempt to provide formal security analysis of signcryption schemes was made by Steinfeld and Zheng [31] , who proposed a signcryption scheme based on the integer factorization problem and provided a formal security model and proof for the unforgeability of the proposed scheme. But, a formal security model and proof for the confidentiality of their scheme was not provided. (We remark, however, that following an earlier version of this work, the analysis of the factoring-based signcryption scheme has been extended to cover both confidentiality and unforgeability in the strong sense that will be presented in the following sections [26] . Interestingly, although the result in [26] for confidentiality is analogous to ours in its reliance on a variant of the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption in a subgroup of Z Z * N for N an RSA modulus, the unforgeability result in [26] , for a suitable choice of scheme parameters, does not rely on a "gap" assumption, but only on the hardness of factoring an RSA modulus N , given a generator for the utilized subgroup of Z Z * N .) Independently of our work, security models for signcryption similar to ours were proposed by An, Dodis and Rabin (ADR) [1] , who analyzed the security of generic compositions of black-box signature and encryption schemes. Our unforgeability notion FSO-UF-CMA, which will be defined precisely in Section 3.3, corresponds to unforgeability in the "Multi-User Insider" setting defined by ADR in [1] , whereas our confidentiality notion FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2, which will be defined precisely in Section 3.2, corresponds to confidentiality in the weaker "Multi-User Outsider" setting of ADR. In Section 1.3.2, we discuss our models and their relationship to those defined by ADR in great detail.
Differences between Our Security Model and Other Models
Differences between Symmetric and Asymmetric Models
To address the significant difference between security implication of the compositions of encryption and authentication in the symmetric setting and that in the asymmetric setting, we consider confidentiality of the "Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM)" and "Encrypt-and-MAC (EaM)" compositions in the symmetric setting, and the security of the directly corresponding simple asymmetric versions "Encrypt-then-Sign (EtS)" and "Encrypt-and-Sign (EaS)" (defined in the natural way, with the signer's public key appended). We point out that while the symmetric composition EtM is secure against chosen ciphertext attack (indeed, EtM is generically secure as shown in [6] ), the simple asymmetric version EtS is completely insecure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, even if the underlying encryption scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. The reason is that in the asymmetric version, a ciphertext in the composed scheme contains an additional component (not present in the symmetric versions), namely the sender's signature public key. The fact that this component is easily malleable implies the insecurity of the asymmetric version EtS under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
As an example, assume that a sender Alice encrypts and signs her message m using the EtS composition. That is, she encrypts the message m using a public key encryption algorithm E pk B (·) and computes c = E pk B (m). Then she signs on c using her digital signature algorithm S sk A (·) to produce σ = S sk A (c). Now the ciphertext C is (c, σ). However, an adversary Marvin now generates his own public and private key pair (pk M , sk M ) and signs on c obtained by eavesdropping the ciphertext C en route from Alice to Bob. Namely, he can produce C = (c, S sk M (c)) where S sk M (·) is Marvin's digital signature algorithm. Then he hands in his public key pk M (which may be contained in Marvin's digital certificate) to Bob. Now notice that C which is different from C is completely verified as a valid ciphertext using Marvin's public key pk M and Bob decrypts it into m. Hence Marvin succeeds in his chosen ciphertext attack on the EtS scheme even if the underlying asymmetric encryption scheme is strong, say, secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. (For completeness, we remark that a secure generic EtS variant which fixes the above problem of the simple EtS was given by An, Dodis and Rabin [1] .)
Discussion of Our Models in the Context of Other Asymmetric Models
The discussion in this section focuses on explaining the relationship between security models for signcryption schemes defined by An, Dodis and Rabin (ADR) [1] and our security notions as defined in Section 3. First, we review the classification of security models for signcryption schemes defined by ADR [1] . Two-User vs. Multi-User Setting. The first classification of security models for signcryption schemes depends on the assumed application setting. In the "Two-User" setting, it is assumed that there are only two users of the scheme: a single sender Alice with key pair (sk A , pk A ) and a single receiver Bob with key pair (sk B , pk B ). Hence in this setting, the receiver's public key for all messages signcrypted by Alice is fixed to Bob's public key pk B . Similarly, the sender's public key for all signcryptexts unsigncrypted by Bob is fixed to Alice's public key pk A . In contrast, the "Multi-User" setting assumes that there are many users of the scheme besides the attacked users Alice and Bob. Thus in this setting, the receiver's public key for messages signcrypted by Alice can be any receiving user's public key pk R (not necessarily Bob's pk B ). Similarly, the sender's public key for signcryptexts unsigncrypted by Bob can be any sending user's public key pk S (not necessarily Alice's pk A ). In particular, in this setting the attacker is given the power to choose his own reciever/sender public keys when accessing Alice/Bob's signcryption/unsigncryption oracles. This power does not exist in the Two-User setting. Insider vs. Outsider Setting. The second classification of security models for signcryption schemes depends on the identity of the attacker. In the "Outsider" setting, the attacker is assumed to be a third-party distinct from both the attacked users Alice and Bob. To break confidentiality in this setting, the goal of the attacker is to recover some information on a message signcrypted by Alice to Bob, assuming the signcryptext has not been unsigncrypted by Bob. To break unforgeability in this setting, the goal of the attacker is to forge a signcryptext from Alice to Bob on a message which has not been signcrypted by Alice. Note that in the outsider setting, since the attacker is a third-party, he only knows the public keys of Alice and Bob. In contrast, in the "Insider" setting, the attacker is assumed to be a second-party, meaning that the attacker is either Alice (attacking Bob's confidentiality) or Bob (attacking Alice's unforgeability). To break Bob's confidentiality in this setting, Alice's goal is to recover any partial information on a message signcrypted to Bob with Alice's public key as the sender's public key, assuming the signcryptext has not been unsigncrypted by Bob with Alice's public key as the sender's public key (note that in this setting, the attacker Alice may know the sender's private key). To break Alice's unforgeability in this setting, Bob's goal is to forge a valid signcryptext from Alice to Bob on a message which has never been signcrypted by Alice to Bob (note that in this setting, the attacker Bob may know the receiver's private key). Our Confidentiality Notion. The strongest confidentiality notion for signcryption schemes is obtained by requiring confidentiality in the "Multi-User Insider" setting. It is easy to verify that Zheng's signcryption scheme is completely insecure in this setting because the Diffie-Hellman key g x A x B (which is easily recoverable by the sender Alice) defined by Alice and Bob's public keys g x A and g x B suffices to unsigncrypt any signcryptext from Alice to Bob. However, we make the following observations. First, we emphasize, as also acknowledged in [1] , that this model is under normal circumstances not of significant importance because it effectively assumes that the sender Alice is trying to unsigncrypt a signcryptext which was sent by herself. Thus this model appears only useful in providing "forward security" under special circumstances in which an attacker who breaks into Alice's system obtains her secret key in order to unsigncrypt a message previously signcrypted by Alice to Bob. Second, as pointed out by Zheng in the full version of the original paper [35] , this insecurity can be considered a positive feature, called "Past Message Recovery", since it allows Alice to store signcryptexts and unsigncrypt them in the future when desired.
In view of the above discussion, we believe that for most applications it suffices for a signcryption scheme to achieve confidentiality in the "Multi-User Outsider" setting. Our independently defined confidentiality notion "FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2" for this setting matches the corresponding definition by ADR [1] . Our Unforgeability Notion. The strongest unforgeability notion for signcryption schemes corresponds to unforgeability in the "Multi-User Insider" setting. Our independently defined unforgeability notion "FSO-UF-CMA" for this setting matches the corresponding definition by ADR [1] .
Like the model proposed by ADR [1] , our model also does not explicitly include support for non-repudiation, that is, the ability of a receiver of a valid signcryptext to convince a third-party that a given sender has sent this signcryptext. However, as also pointed out in [1] , unforgeability in the sense of FSO-UF-CMA guarantees that the receiver cannot forge any valid signcryptext by the sender, so non-repudiation can always be achieved using a protocol run between the receiver and the third-party, which convinces the third-party of the validity of a signcryptext with respect to a given message and sender and receiver public keys. A generic solution which does not compromise the receiver's secret key to the third-party, is to use a zero-knowledge proof of signcryptext validity. Specific protocols for Zheng's scheme are presented by Zheng in [35] . On the Power of Attackers in the Multi-User Setting. The extra power given to the attacker in Multi-User setting is the ability to access "flexible" signcryption/unsigncryption oracles which allow the attacker to specify a receiver/sender's public key in addition to a message/signcryptext. In a practical application, such an attack might be mounted by the attacker Marvin by requesting a new public key certificate from the Certificate Authority (CA) each time he wants to query Alice's signcryption oracle with a new public key of his choice. A scheme meeting our security notion must be secure even if Marvin can get as many public key certificates issued as he wishes for arbitrary public keys of his choice. In some applications it may be possible to place significant constraints on the public keys that Marvin can use, for example through additional checks by the CA that users "know" the secret key associated to their public key. However, we believe that for the sake of wide applicability one should be conservative and avoid such assumptions if possible.
Security of signcryption in the Two-User setting does not imply security in the Multi-User setting. Furthermore, there is no known efficient (in particular, not using encryption/signature primitives) generic conversion of a "Two-User secure" scheme into a "Multi-User secure" scheme. The "semi-generic" efficient conversion given by An Dodis and Rabin [1] only works for the schemes they considered, which are built from separate signature and encryption primitives (the incorrect claim in the conference paper [1] that the conversion is generic was subsequently corrected in an updated version of the paper [2] ).
To get a feeling for the issues involved, consider the following example (which can be used as a counterexample to prove that the semi-generic conversion in [1, 2] is not generic). Given a signcryption scheme secure in the Two-User setting, we construct a new signcryption scheme which is identical except that the signcryption algorithm appends in the signcryptext one bit of the sender's secret key, where the secret bit position is determined as a function of the receiver's public key. In the Two-User setting, a forging attacker can only query the sender's signcryption oracle with one receiver public key fixed for the whole attack and hence in this setting the forger can only get a single bit of the secret key. Consequently the new scheme is still unforgeable in the Two-User setting. On the other hand, in the Multi-User setting, the attacker can quickly get all the bits of the sender's secret key by querying the signcryption oracle with many different receiver public keys, so the scheme is easily forgeable in the Multi-User setting (and it remains forgeable in the Multi-User setting, for the same reason, even after applying the semi-generic conversion in [1, 2] ). This example is not entirely artificial -indeed it is because of an interaction between the receiver's public key and the sender's secret key in Zheng's signcryption scheme that we need in this paper, for instance, the "Gap Discrete Log" assumption to prove unforgeability in the Multi-User setting, whereas just the weaker "Discrete Log" assumption suffices for unforgeability in the Two-User setting [3] . Other Assumptions. We point out two implicit assumptions we have made in the current work. The first is that our Multi-User models apply to "static" attackers because the attacked public keys are fixed at the beginning of the attack game. The second is that our scheme assumes the standard practice that each user generates two independent private/public key-pairs for sending and receiving, respectively. However, we remark that our security proofs for Zheng's scheme under the GDH assumption can be extended to the "key-reuse" setting where a single key-pair is used for both signcryption and unsigncryption (this involves simulating the additional oracles present in this setting in the same way as the oracle simulations performed in the current proofs).
Our Main Results
The most attractive feature of Zheng's signcryption scheme is its efficiency. Namely, the dominant computational cost in both signcryption and unsigncryption algorithms is approximately only a single exponentiation in the underlying subgroup. This high efficiency is achieved by sharing the exponentiation for both the encryption and signature "portions" of the computation, and is therefore at least 2 times more efficient than a generic composition (using one of the generic compositions presented in [1] ) of discrete log based signature and encryption schemes, each of which would presumably perform (at least) one separate exponentiation.
Our results demonstrate that despite its high efficiency, Zheng's scheme still achieves strong security notions in the Multi-User setting with respect to known cryptographic assumptions and the random-oracle model for the underlying hash functions. In particular, our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we prove, in the random-oracle model, that Zheng's scheme achieves confidentiality in the Multi-User Outsider setting (or equivalently "FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2", which will formally be defined in the next section) under the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption [21] in a prime-order subgroup of Z Z * p , where p is prime, and the assumption that the underlying onetime symmetric encryption scheme is secure. Second, we prove, in the random oracle model, that Zheng's scheme achieves unforgeability in the Multi-User Insider setting (or equivalently "FSO-UF-CMA", which will formally be defined in the next section) assuming the Gap Discrete Log (GDL) assumption in the underlying subgroup, which is implied by, but is possibly a weaker assumption than, the GDH assumption in the same subgroup.
We note that Zheng's scheme relies for its security on specific number-theoretic computational complexity assumptions, and on the random oracle model. These assumptions may be avoided, at the cost of efficiency, by using a generic encryption/signature composition scheme and applying the results in [1] .
Preliminaries
Symbols and Notations
We use the notation A(·, ·) to denote an algorithm, with input arguments separated by commas (our underlying computational model is a Turing Machine). If algorithm A makes calls to oracles, we list the oracles separated from the algorithm inputs by the symbol "|". For a probabilistic algorithm A(·), we use A(x; r) to denote the output of A on input x with a randomness input r. If we do not specify r explicitly we do so with the understanding that r is chosen statistically independent of all other variables. We denote by {A(x)} the set of outputs of A on input x as we sweep the randomness input for A through all possible strings.
We denote by g is a subgroup generated by a group element g. We denote | · | the number of bits in the binary representation of an input.
Given a set SP sk we denote by sk R ← SP sk the assignment of a uniformly and independently distributed random element from the set SP sk to the variable sk.
For integers g and p, we let Ord p (g) denote the order of g in the multiplicative group Z Z * p . We say a probability function f :
3 Our Security Notions for Signcryption Schemes
Description of Generic Signcryption Scheme
First, we formally define a "signcryption" scheme in a general way as follows.
Definition 1 (Generic Signcryption Scheme) A signcryption scheme SCR = (GC, GK A , GK B , SC, USC) consists of the following algorithms:
parameter k and other system-wide parameters such as description of computational groups and hash functions.
2. A probabilistic sender key-pair generation algorithm GK A that takes a common parameter sequence cp as input and returns a sender's secret/public key-pair (sk A , pk A ).
3. A probabilistic receiver key-pair generation algorithm GK B that takes a common parameter sequence cp as input and returns a receiver's secret/public key-pair (sk B , pk B ).
4.
A probabilistic signcryption algorithm SC that takes a common parameters sequence cp, a sender's secret key sk A , a receiver's public key pk B , and a message m ∈ SP m as input (SP m is the message space) as input, and returns a signcryptext C.
5. An unsigncryption algorithm USC that takes as input a common parameters sequence cp, a receiver's secret key sk B , a sender's public key pk A , a signcryptext C as input, and returns either a message m or a "Rej (reject)" symbol.
Confidentiality Notion for Signcryption Schemes in the FSO/FUO Model
Following the discussions in Section 1.3, we provide an attack model for confidentiality of the generic signcryption scheme SCR, which we call the "Flexible Signcryption Oracle/Flexible Unsigncryption Oracle (FSO/FUO)"-model. In this model, the adversary Marvin's goal is to break the confidentiality of messages between the sender Alice and the receiver Bob. Marvin is given Alice's public key pk * A and Bob's public key pk * B , and has access to a "flexible" signcryption oracle, as well as a "flexible" unsigncryption oracle: On receiving (pk R , m) where pk R denotes a receiver's public key generated by Marvin at will (Marvin may choose the receiver's public key as Bob's public key pk * B , say, pk R = pk * B .) and m denotes a plaintext, the flexible signcryption oracle returns a signcryptext after performing signcryption under Alice's private key sk * A . We denote the flexible signcryption oracle by SC(cp, sk * A , ·, ·) where no specified receiver's public key is presented as input argument. On the other hand, the flexible unsigncryption oracle, on receiving (pk S , C) where pk S denotes a sender's public key generated by Marvin at will (Similarly to the flexible signcryption oracle, Marvin may choose the sender's public key as Alice's public key pk * A , say, pk S = pk * A .) and C denotes a signcryptext, returns a plaintext or a "Rej " (Reject) symbol after performing unsigncryption under Bob's private key sk * B . Note that the unsigncryption oracle is denoted by USC(cp, sk * B , ·, ·), where no specified sender's public key is presented as input argument.
In other words, the flexible signcryption and unsigncryption oracles are not constrained to be executed only under pk * B and pk * A respectively -Bob and Alice's public key can be replaced by the public keys generated by Marvin. Accordingly, the FSO/FUO-model gives Marvin the full chosen-plaintext/ciphertext power with the ability to choose the sender and receiver's public keys, the message as well as the signcryptext.
Using the notion of indistinguishability of encryption [5] , we formalize the confidentiality of signcryption against the above-described (adaptive) chosen ciphertext attack under the FSO/FUOmodel. We say a signcryption scheme is secure in the sense of indistinguishability (abbreviated by "IND"), there is no polynomial-time adversary that can learn any information about the plaintext from the signcryptext except for its length. Following the style of [5] , we call this confidentiality notion of signcryption "FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2". Below, we formally define FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2.
Definition 2 (FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2)
Let SCR = (GC, GK A , GK B , SC, USC) be a generic signcryption scheme. Let A CCA be an attack algorithm (attacker) against the indistinguishability of the scheme SCR. Consider the following attack game.
Note that two messages m 0 and m 1 output by the attacker satisfy |m 0 | = |m 1 |. Note also that A CCA is allowed to query (pk S , C * ) to the unsigncryption oracle USC(cp, sk * B , ·, ·) where unsigncryption is performed under the public key pk S which is arbitrarily chosen by A CCA and is different from pk * A . We quantify A CCA 's success by the probability
We also quantify the insecurity of scheme SCR in the sense of FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2 against arbitrary attackers with resource parameters RP = (t, q SC , q USC )by the advantage
The attacker set AS RP contains all attackers with resource parameters RP , meaning running time+program size at most t, at most q SC and q USC queries to the signcryption and unsigncryption oracles respectively. We say SCR is FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2 secure if InSec
is negligible function in k for any polynomials t, q SC , and q USC in k.
Unforgeability Notion for Signcryption Schemes in the FSO Model
We now present our unforgeability notion which we call "FSO-UF-CMA" meaning unforgeability of signcryption against adaptive chosen message attack with respect to the FSO-model. Recall that this notion corresponds to ADR's Multi-User Insider model.
The model is as follows. The forger Marvin's goal is to forge a valid signcryptext from Alice to some other user. Marvin is given Alice's (random) public key pk * A . In addition, Marvin is given access to Alice's flexible signcryption oracle (FSO), namely SC(cp, sk * A , ·, ·). Marvin can choose any receiver public key pk R and message m and query the flexible signcryption oracle to get a signcryptext by Alice on message m to the specified receiver's public key pk R . At the end of the attack, Marvin is considered successful in his forgery if he produces a forgery signcryptext C * and a forgery receiver public key pk * R such that: (1) C * is a valid signcryptext from Alice to the receiver who holds a public key pk * R (this means that USC(cp, sk * R , pk * A , C * ) does not reject, where sk * R is the private key corresponding to the forgery recipient public key pk * R ), and (2) Marvin did not query (pk * R , m * ) to Alice's flexible signcryption oracle, where m * = USC(cp, sk * R , pk * A , C * ) is the forgery message.
We remark that, because it applies to the Multi-User setting, our new unforgeability model is stronger than those which appeared in our earlier works [31, 3] in two ways. First, earlier models allowed Marvin only chosen message access to Alice's signcryption oracle with a fixed receiver public key, whereas we allow Marvin full flexibility in choosing the receiver public key pk M . Second, in earlier models Marvin's goal was to forge a signcryptext from Alice to a specified receiver (who possesses a fixed receiver public key). However, in our new model, we allow Marvin full flexibility in choosing a receiver whose receiver public key is denoted by pk * R . Note that our new forgery goal is very weak: we do not even require Marvin to demonstrate "knowledge" of the secret key sk * R corresponding to pk * R , and we allow either (i) Conventional forgeries, where the message m * is "new" (as in previous models) or (ii) "Recipient Transfer" forgery, where the forgery message m * was previously queried to Alice's signcryption oracle but it was never signcrypted under the recipient key pk * R . We remark that a "Recipient Transfer" forgery was called a "Double Spending" attack in [35] , due to its implication in e-commerce payment applications.
Finally, one may wonder why we do not give the attacker access to the sender's unsigncryption oracle. The reason is that we assume the well-established practice that users generate independent key-pairs for sending and receiving. In this setting it is clear that the sender's unsigncryption oracle cannot help a forger because the forger can simulate such an oracle by himself.
We now give the precise definition of our new unforgeability notion FSO-UF-CMA.
Definition 3 (FSO-UF-CMA) Let SCR = (GC, GK A , GK B , SC, USC) be a signcryption scheme. Let A UF be an attack algorithm (attacker) against the unforgeability of the scheme SCR. Consider the following attack game.
We quantify A UF 's success in breaking the FSO-UF-CMA security notion of scheme SCR by the probability
We quantify the insecurity of scheme SCR in the sense of FSO-UF-CMA against arbitrary attackers with resource parameters RP = (t, q SC ) by the advantage
The attacker set AS RP contains all attackers with resource parameters RP , meaning running time+program size at most t and at most q SC queries to the signcryption oracle.
We say SCR is FSO-UF-CMA secure if InSec
is negligible function in k for any polynomials t and q SC in k.
Zheng's Original Signcryption Scheme
In this section, we give a full description of Zheng's original signcryption scheme [34] .
One-time Symmetric Key Encryption Scheme
As a preliminary, we review the definition of the "one-time symmetric key encryption [11] " which serves as a building block for Zheng's original signcryption scheme. In fact, one-time symmetric key encryption schemes are usually used to build hybrid public key encryption schemes as discussed in [11] . The one-time symmetric key encryption scheme defined here plays the same role as the one used in hybrid public key encryption schemes: The symmetric key is used only once to encrypt a single message.
Definition 4 (One-time Symmetric Key Encryption) An one-time symmetric key encryption scheme SKE consists of the following algorithms:
1. A deterministic encryption algorithm E that takes a security parameter k, a symmetric key τ ∈ SP τ , and a message m ∈ SP m as input, and returns a ciphertext c ∈ SP c . (Note that SP m , SP τ , and SP c denote respectively the message, key, and ciphertext spaces whose size varies as the security parameter k).
2. A deterministic decryption algorithm D that takes a security parameter k, a symmetric key τ ∈ SP τ , and a ciphertext c ∈ SP c as input, and returns a a message m ∈ SP m . The function defined by D is one-to-one on SP c and onto SP m .
Note that we do not need the security against chosen plaintext attacks for the one-time symmetric key encryption scheme to prove the confidentiality of Zheng's scheme. An appropriate security notion for the one-time symmetric key encryption scheme will be given in Section 5.2. On the other hand, we do need in our security proof of security that this scheme is bijective meaning in particular the decryption function is one-to-one on the ciphertext space SP c (and hence also encryption is deterministic).
We remark that the one-time pad is a computationally efficient and unconditionally secure bijective one-time symmetric encryption scheme suitable for our application. The key size can be reduced by generating it from a short key using a pseudorandom generator, resulting in a computationally secure one-time symmetric encryption scheme.
Description of Zheng's Original Signcryption Scheme
Zheng's signcryption scheme described in this section is based on the shorthand digital signature scheme (SDSS1) [34] which is a variant of ElGamal based signature schemes. Another signcryption scheme SDSS2 can be described and analyzed in a very similar manner presented in this paper so that we only consider the SDSS1-type signcryption scheme.
To simplify the security analysis, we have slightly modified the scheme SDSS1. In particular, in our modified scheme the "Diffie-Hellman Key" K is directly provided as input to the hash function H without first being hashed by the other hash function G.
Definition 5 (Zheng's Original Signcryption Scheme) Each sub-algorithm of Zheng's original signcryption scheme ZSCR works as follows.
Zheng's Original Signcryption ZSCR
Common parameter/oracle generation GC(k)
Choose at random primes p and q such that 
Receiver key-pair generation GK B (cp)
Note that the hash functions G : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l G (k) and H : {0, 1} * → Z Z q are modelled as the random oracles [8] in the security analysis. Note also that the key length of the symmetric encryption is actually l G (k).
Security Analysis of Zheng's Signcryption Scheme
In this section, we prove the confidentiality and unforgeability of Zheng's signcryption by providing reductions from known cryptographic assumptions. Although we provide a concrete analysis of our reductions, our main goal is to demonstrate the security of signcryption against polynomial-time attackers. Hence we did not attempt to optimize the insecurity bounds for our reductions.
First, we recall the definition of the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem given in [21] and define a Gap Discrete Log problem.
Computational Primitives
Gap Diffie Hellman (GDH)
At PKC 2001, Okamoto and Pointcheval [21] proposed a new computational problem called a "Gap problem" in which an attacker tries to solve an inverting problem with the help of an oracle that solves a related decisional problem. Namely, the Gap problem is dual of inverting and decisional problems.
For our proof of confidentiality of Zheng's original signcryption in the security model proposed in this paper, we will need the "Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH)" problem [21] in which the attacker is given, in addition to the group element g a and g b for random a, b ∈ Z Z * q , access to a Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) oracle (g a , g b ) . The GDH assumption says that the GDH problem is computationally intractable. A precise definition follows.
Definition 6 (GDH assumption) Let GC(k) be the common parameter generation algorithm that outputs (g, p, q), where p and q are primes such that |p| = k, q|(p − 1), and q > 2 l q (k) where l q : IN → IN denotes a function determining the length of q; g ∈ Z Z * p satisfies Ord p (g) = q. Let A GDH be an attacker. Define the following game.
is a Decisional Diffie-Hellman oracle, which, on input (ḡ,ḡ u ,ḡ v , z), outputs 1 if z =ḡ uv and 0 otherwise. We quantify A GDH 's success in solving the GDH problem by the probability
Also we quantify the insecurity of the GDH problem against arbitrary attackers with resource parameters RP = (t, q O DDH ) by the probability
The attacker set AS RP contains all attackers with resource parameters RP , meaning running time+program size at most t, and at most q O DDH queries to oracle O DDH . We say the GDH assumption holds if InSec
is negligible function in k for any polynomials t and q O DDH in k.
Gap Discrete Log (GDL)
For our proof of unforgeability of Zheng's original signcryption scheme, we will need the following "Gap Discrete Log (GDL)" problem. The GDL problem is the discrete log analogue of the GDH problem defined above. The GDL problem is possibly easier than the classical discrete log problem because here the attacker is given, in addition to the group element g a whose discrete log a with respect to a given base g is desired, access to a restricted Decisional Diffie-Hellman oracle O rDDH that given (g, g a ,ḡ v , z) ∈ g × g × g × g checks whether z = (ḡ v ) a or not. Notice that compared with the DDH oracle O DDH used in the GDH problem, the first two inputs g and g a are fixed in the restricted DDH oracle O rDDH . The GDL assumption says that the GDL problem is computationally intractable. A precise definition now follows.
Definition 7 (GDL assumption) Let GC(k) be the common parameter generation algorithm that outputs (g, p, q), where p and q are primes such that |p| = k, q|(p − 1), and q > 2 l q (k) where l q : IN → IN denotes a function determining the length of q; g ∈ Z Z * p satisfies Ord p (g) = q. Let A GDL be an attacker. Define the game
is a restricted Decisional Diffie-Hellman oracle, which, on input (g, g a ,ḡ v , z), outputs 1 if z = (ḡ v ) a and 0 otherwise. We quantify A GDL 's success in solving the SDL problem by the probability
We quantify the insecurity of GDL against arbitrary attackers with resource parameters RP = (t, q O rDDH ) by the probability We remark that in the GDH problem, the attacker's goal is weaker, namely to find the DiffieHellman key K = g ab (to given base g) corresponding to the given pair (g a , g b ). Since the discrete log of g a allows the attacker to easily compute the Diffie-Hellman key K = g ab , it follows that if the attacker can solve the GDL problem, then he can also solve the GDH problem. This means that the GDH assumption implies the GDL assumption. However, the converse may not hold, and the GDL assumption may actually be a weaker assumption than the GDH assumption.
Security Notion for One-time Symmetric Encryption
We now define a security notion for the one-time symmetric key encryption scheme SKE presented in Section 4.1. As mentioned earlier, we do not need the security against chosen plaintext attacks for SKE. We merely need the security against a passive attack called "passive indistinguishability of symmetric key encryption (PI-SKE)" [11] . A formal definition follows.
Definition 8 (PI-SKE for One-time Symmetric Key Encryption) Let SKE = (E, D) be a bijective one-time symmetric key encryption scheme. Let A PI be an attacker that defeats the security of SKE in the sense of PI-SKE. Let k ∈ N be a security parameter. A specification for the attack game is as follows.
We quantify A PI 's success by the probability
We quantify the insecurity of scheme SKE in the sense of PI-SKE against arbitrary attackers with resource parameters RP = t by the advantage
The attacker set AS RP contains all attackers with resource parameters RP , meaning running time+program size at most t. We say SKE is PI-SKE secure if InSec
PI−SKE SKE
(t) is negligible function in k for any polynomial in t in k.
Confidentiality of Zheng's Signcryption Scheme
For confidentiality proof of Zheng's original signcryption scheme ZSCR, we adopt the proof methodology recently appeared in the literature. (Readers are referred to the surveys on this technique such as [29] or [9] .): We start with the real attack game where the attacker A CCA tries to defeat the security of the ZSCR scheme in the sense of FSO/FUO-IND-CCA defined in Section 3.2. We then modify this game by changing its rules and obtain a new game. Note here that the rules of each game are to describe how variables in the view of A CCA are computed. We repeat the modification until we obtain games related to the ability of the attackers A PI and A GDH to defeat the security of the one-time symmetric key encryption scheme SKE and to solve the GDH problem respectively. When a new game is derived from a previous one, a difference of the views of the attacker in each game might occur. This difference is measured by the technique presented in the following lemma. 
Lemma 1 Let
The proof is a straightforward calculation and can be found in [29, 9] . We now state and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 If the GDH assumption holds and the bijective one-time symmetric key encryption scheme SKE is PI-SKE secure then Zheng's original signcryption scheme ZSCR is secure in the FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2 sense. Concretely, the following bound holds:
Proof. Our aim is to keep modifying the real attack game SCRINDGame presented in Definition 2 until we get to the stage where we obtain SKECFGame in Definition 8 and GDHGame in Definition 6. We use "A CCA " to refer to the FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2 attacker and use "A GDH " to refer to the attacker for the GDH problem. Given (k, p, q, g, g a , g b ) for random a, b ∈ Z Z * q , A GDH 's goal is to compute the Diffie-Hellman key g ab with the help of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) oracle
We start with the following game.
• Game G 0 : This game is the same as the real attack game SCRINDGame in Definition 2.
First, we run the common parameter/oracle generation algorithm GC of ZSCR on input a security parameter k and obtain a common parameter cp = (p, q, g, G, H, SKE), where p and q are primes such that |p| = k, q > 2 lq(k) , and q|(p − 1); g is an element in Z Z * p such that Ord p (g) = q; G : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l G (k) and H : {0, 1} * → Z Z q are hash functions modelled as the random oracles [8] ; SKE is the bijective one-time symmetric key encryption scheme that consists of the encryption function E and the decryption function D. We then run the sender/receiver key generation algorithms GK A and GK B respectively on input cp and k, and obtain Alice (sender) and Bob (receiver) ' 
where
for x * picked uniformly at random from Z Z * q . On input C * , A CCA outputs β ∈ {0, 1} at guess stage. We denote by S 0 the event β = β and use a similar notation S i for all games G i .
Since this game is the same as the real attack game, we have
• Game G 1 : In this game, we modify the target signcrytext C * presented in the previous game. The modification obeys the following rules.
R1-1 First, we choose τ + ∈ {0, 1} l G (k) , r + ∈ Z Z q , and s + ∈ Z Z * q uniformly at random. We then compute c + = E τ + (m β ) for random β ∈ {0, 1} and replace c * , r * , s * , and G(K * ) in the target signcryptext C * by c + , r + , s + , and τ + respectively. A new target signcryptext is now (c + , r + , s + ) and is denoted by C * + . R1-2 Whenever the random oracle G is queried at K * = (y * B ) s + (r + +x * A ) (as defined by r + and s+), we respond with τ + .
R1-3 Whenever the random oracle H is queried at (m β , y *
A , y * B , K * ), where
, we respond with r + . R1-4 We assume that the signcryption and unsigncryption oracles are perfect. That is, on receiving A CCA 's signcryption query (y R , m) or unsigncryption query (y S , C) = (y * A , C * ), where y S and y R respectively denote sender and receiver's public keys arbitrarily selected by A CCA , and m and C denote a message and a signcryptext respectively, we signcrypt (y R , m) using the private key x * A or unsigncrypt (y S , m) using the private key x * B in the same way as we do in the real attack game.
Since we have replaced one set of random variables by another set of random variables which is different, yet has the same distribution, the attacker A CCA 's view has the same distribution in both Game G 0 and Game G 1 except for the event that (m β , y * A , y * B , K * ) is queried to H at find stage because we only know m β at the end of find stage. But the error probability is small and is at most (q H + q SC + q USC )/2 lq(k) because K * is independent of the attacker's view in find stage.
Accordingly, we have
• Game G 2 : In this game, we retain the rules R1-1 and R1-4, renaming them as "R2-1" and "R2-4" respectively. However, we drop the rules R1-2 and R1-3 meaning that τ + and s + are used only in producing the target signcryptext C * + while in other cases when the signcryption or unsigncryption oracle queries to the random oracles G and H, or A CCA directly queries to them, answers from G or H are taken. We refer to these rules regarding the random oracles G and H as "R2-2" and "R2-3" respectively.
Since we have dropped the rule R1-2, τ + is not used anywhere in game G 2 except in computing c * . Hence if β = β then A CCA has broken the PI-SKE security of the bijective one-time symmetric encryption scheme. Hence, we have
Now, let AskKey 2 denote an event that, in Game G 2 , G is queried at K * by A CCA (rather than by the signcryption or unsigncryption oracles) or H is queried at (m, y , y , K * ) for some (m, y , y ) by A CCA (again, rather than by the signcryption or unsigncryption oracles). We will use an identical notation AskKey i for all the remaining games.
Notice that Game G 1 and Game G 2 may differ if G is queried at K * , where
. Therefore, besides AskKey 2 , we need to consider the following events defined in game G 2 (we define them to be disjoint by terminating the game as soon as one of them occurs).
-SCBad 2 : G is queried at K * or H is queried at (m, y , y , K * ) by the signcryption oracle.
-USCBad 2 : For some unsigncryption query (y S , c, r, s), the unsigncryption oracle queries G at K * and the unsigncryption oracle accepts (y S , c, r, s) (i.e. does not reject). Consider an outcome of event ¬B 2 in which the view of A CCA is identical in G 1 and G 2 up to the ith unsigncryption oracle query (y S , c, r, s) of A CCA . We show that this query is answered identically by the unsigncryption oracle in both G 1 and G 2 . Let K = (g r y S ) sx * B denote the key queried to G (in both G 1 and G 2 ) by the unsigncryption oracle. If K = K * then the unsigncryption oracle proceeds identically in G 1 and G 2 , so we assume that K = K * . Also, we assume that r ∈ Z Z q , s ∈ Z Z * q , c ∈ SP c and y S ∈< g > since otherwise the query is rejected in both G 1 and G 2 .
-In Game G 2 , the unsigncryption oracle obtains τ = G(K * ) and queries H at (D τ (c), y S , y * B , K * ), obtaining response h USC [j] where j ≤ i is the index of the earliest unsigncryption query where the unsigncryption oracle queried H at (D τ (c) , y S , y * B , K * ). Thanks to the one-to-one property of the decryption function D, j is the index of the first unsigncryption query (y S,j , c j , r j , s j ) satisfying (y S,j , c j ) = (y S , c) and (g r j y S ) s j x * B = K * . By definition of ¬B 2 we know that the unsigncryption oracle rejects the query (y S , c, r, s) Therefore, the unsigncryption oracle responds identically in G 1 and G 2 when ¬B 2 occurs, as claimed.
But, event SCBad 2 has a negligible probability. Namely due to the uniform distribution of K computed by the signcryption in g \ {1}, the probability that K hits K * is less than 1/2 lq(k) per each signcryption query. Consequently we have Pr[
Also, event USCBad 2 has a negligible probability. Namely, let USCBad 2 [i] denote the event in G 2 that i is the index of the earliest unsigncryption query (y S , c, r, s) such that the unsigncryption oracle queries G at K * and the unsigncryption oracle accepts (y S , c, r, s) Thus, finally we get
• Game G 3 : In this game, we modify the rule R2-4 and obtain a new rule R3-4. However, we retain the rules R2-1, R2-2 and R2-3 in Game G 2 , renaming them as "R3-1", "R3-2" and "R3-3" respectively.
R3-4
In this rule, we replace the random oracles G and H by the random oracle simulators GSim and HSim. Note that two types of "query-answer" lists GList1 and GList2 are maintained for the simulation of the random oracle G. GList1 consists of simple "inputoutput" entries for G of the form (K, τ ). GList2 (whose new entries are added by either the signcryption oracle simulator) consists of the special input-output entries for G which are of the form y R ||ω||(?, τ ). This implicitly represents the input-output relation τ = G(ω log g y R ), although the input ω log g y R is not explicitly stored and hence is denoted by "?". Similarly to GSim, the simulator HSim also maintains two input-output lists HList1 and HList2. HList1 consists of simple input-output entries for H, which are of the form (µ, r). HList2 (whose new entries are added by either the signcryption or unsigncryption oracle simulators in later games) consists of the special input-output entries for H which are of the form y R ||ω||((m, y S , y R , ?), r) and implicitly represents the input-output relation H(m, y S , y R , K) = r, where K = ω log g y R is not explicitly stored and hence is denoted by "?". Complete specifications for GSim and HSim are as follows.
Random Oracle Simulators GSim and HSim
We note that GList2 and HList2 are actually empty throughout this game because we still have the original signcryption and unsigncryption oracles, so no entries are ever added to them -GList1 and HList1 are used in this game. • Game G 4 : We retain all the rules R3-1, R3-2 and R3-3, renaming them as "R4-1", "R4-2"
and "R4-3" respectively. But we further modify R3-4 and obtain a new rule "R4-4".
R4-4
In this rule, we replace the signcryption oracle by the signcryption oracle simulator SCSim. On the other hand, we assume that the unsigncryption oracle is perfect.
Signcryption Oracle Simulator SCSim
exists in GList1 and HList1 respectively, the simulated signcryptext in G 4 is distributed the same as the signcryptext in Game G 3 and a simulation error occurs otherwise.
But in G 3 , thanks to the uniform distribution of K in g \ {1}, and since GList1 and HList1 contain all the queries to G and H both by the attacker; and the signcryption and unsigncryption oracles, we have Pr
.
Since there are up to q SC signcryption queries, the total probability of outcomes leading to signcryption oracle simulation error is upper-bounded by:
Summing up all decryption queries, we have
• Game G 5 : We retain the rules R4-1, R4-2 and R4-3, renaming them as "R5-1", "R5-2" and "R5-3" respectively. But we modify R4-4 and obtain the following new rule "R5-4".
R5-4
We replace the unsigncryption oracle by a unsigncryption oracle simulator USCSim which can unsigncrypt a submitted unsigncryption query (y S , C) where C = (c, r, s), without knowing the private key. Notice that the unsigncryption oracle simulator makes use of A GDH 's DDH oracle O DDH (·, ·, ·, ·) to check whether a given tuple is Diffie-Hellman one.
Unsigncryption Oracle Simulator USCSim
Observe that the full contents of GList1 ∨ GList2 and HList1 ∨ HList2 are updated identically in games G 4 and G 5 , where full means that before comparing the lists in the two games, we convert the implicit GList2 and HList2 entries into the explicit entries that they represent (with the appropriate K values). This is because the only difference is that in G 5 the unsigncryption oracle adds implicit entries to GList2 and HList2, while in G 4 they are added explicitly to GList1 and HList1. Thanks to the DDH oracle used by GSim, HSim and USCSim, the oracles respond in a way which depends only on the full contents of GList and HList, and hence the view of A CCA is identical in G 4 and G 5 so Since Game G 2 , AskKey i for i = 2, 3, 4, 5 has implied that when AskKey i occurs the GDH problem can be solved. More precisely, the event AskKey i for i ≥ 2 means that
Furthermore, at this stage, one can check which one of the queries to the random oracles G and H is a Diffie-Hellman key of g ab using A GDH 's DDH oracle O DDH (·, ·, ·, ·). Consequently we have
Putting all the bounds we have obtained in each game together, we obtain 1 2 Succ
The advantage bound claim of the theorem follows upon taking maximums over all adversaries with the appropriate resource parameters. The running time counts can be readily checked.
Unforgeability of Zheng's Signcryption Scheme
In this section we prove that the GDL assumption is sufficient for the signcryption scheme ZSCR to achieve the strong unforgeability in the sense of FSO-UF-CMA in the random oracle model. 
Here t denotes the running time of the one-time symmetric key encryption scheme.
Proof. We show how to use any efficient FSO-UF-CMA attacker A UF to construct an efficient attacker A GDL against the GDL problem, thus contradicting the GDL assumption. We will do this in two stages. In stage 1 we use A UF to construct an efficient algorithm A GDL for a variant of the GDL problem that we define below and call GDL'. Then in stage 2 we show how to transform any efficient algorithm for GDL' into an efficient algorithm for GDL.
Stage 1. In this stage, our aim is to keep modifying the real attack game SCRUFGame presented in Definition 3 until we get to the stage where we obtain a game which constitutes an algorithm for the GDL' problem, which is defined as follows :
g to a random beacon R which returns uniformly random independent integers r[i] ∈ Z Z q (for i = 1, . . . , q R ), and up to q O rDDH queries to a restricted DDH oracle
We stress that the random beacon R above differs from a random oracle because R always returns independent random integers, even for repeated queries.
• Game G 0 : This game is the same as the real attack game SCRUFGame in Definition 3.
First, we run the common parameter/oracle generation algorithm GC of ZSCR on input a security parameter k and obtain a common parameter cp = (p, q, g, G, H, SKE), where p and q are primes such that q|(p − 1), g is an element in Z Z * p such that Ord p (g) = q, G : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l G (k) and H : {0, 1} * → Z Z q are hash functions modelled as the random oracles [8] , and SKE is the one-time symmetric key encryption scheme that consists of the encryption function E and the decryption function D. We then run the sender key generation algorithm GK A on input (k, cp) to obtain Alice (sender)'s fixed private/public key pair. Here, Alice's private key consists of (x * A , y * A ) where y * A = g x * A , and her public key is y * A itself. We then run A UF on input the public key y * A . We answer A UF 's queries using the real SC, G and H oracles. Eventually, A UF returns a forgery (C * , y * R ), where C * = (c * , r * , s * ) is the forged signcryptext and y * R is the forgery recipient's public key. We then apply the unsigncryption algorithm to compute K * = (y * R ) (r * +x * A )s * , τ * = G(K * ), and m * = D τ (c * ) and perform the following verification checks:
4 (y * R , m * ) was not queried by A UF to SC oracle.
We denote by S 0 the event that A UF succeeds in the sense of FSO-UF-CMA so all verification checks above are passed, and use a similar notation S i for all games G i .
• Game G 1 : In this game, we modify one of the verification checks for A UF 's output forgery. The modification obeys the following rules (note that rules R1-2, R1-3 and R1-4 are also satisfied in Game G 0 ).
R1-1
Instead of the verification check (3), we check that H (m * , y * A , y * R , K * ) = r * , where H is a new random oracle independent of H.
R1-2
We use the random oracle G to answer all queries to G in the game.
R1-3 We use the random oracle H to answer all queries to H in the game.
R1-4
We use the signcryption algorithm SC to answer all signcryption queries in the game. 
• Game G 2 : In this game, we modify rules R1-2 and R1-3 to obtain new rules R2-2 and R2-3.
However, we retain the rules R1-1 and R1-4, renaming them R2-1 and R2-4, respectively.
R2-2
We use a random oracle simulator GSim to answer all queries to G in the game.
R2-3
We use a random oracle simulator HSim to answer all queries to H in the game.
Note that two types of "query-answer" lists GList1 and GList2 are used by Gsim for the simulation of the random oracle G. These lists are initialized as empty and updated as the game runs. Note that list GList2 is never updated in this game but will be updated by the signcryption oracle simulator in game G 3 . The list GList1 consists of simple "input-output" entries for G of the form (K, τ ). The list GList2 consists of the special input-output entries for G which are of the form y R ||r||s||(?, τ ). This implicitly represents the input-output relation τ = G(y
is not explicitly stored and hence is denoted by "?". Similarly to GSim, the simulator HSim also uses two input-output lists HList1 and HList2 (once again, the list HList2 is never updated in this game but will be in game G 3 ). HList1 consists of simple input-output entries for H, which are of the form (µ, r). HList2 consists of the special input-output entries for H which are of the form y R ||r||s||((m, y S , y R , ?), r) and implicitly represents the input-output relation H(m, y S , y R , K) = r, where K = y (r+x * A )s R is not explicitly stored and hence is denoted by "?". Note that HSim also uses a random beacon R to compute independent and uniformly random values r = R(y R , K) in Z Z q (the beacon R differs from a random oracle because it always returns independent random strings, even for repeated queries). Complete specifications for GSim and HSim are as follows.
Random Oracle Simulators GSim and HSim
Return τ Else if (K, τ ) exists in GList1
Return τ
Note that the above simulation for the random oracles G and H is perfect. Hence, we have
• Game G 3 : We retain rules R2-1, R2-2 and R2-3, renaming them as "R3-1", "R3-2" and "R3-3" respectively. But we modify rule R2-4 and obtain a new rule "R3-4".
R5-4
We use a signcryption oracle simulator SCSim to answer all signcryption queries in the game.
The specification for signcryption oracle SCSim follows.
In Game G 2 , define the event B 2 that for some signcryption query we have (K, τ ) ∈ GList1 or ((m, y * A , y R , K), r) ∈ HList1. Note that in Game G 2 , if B 2 does not occur then (τ, r, s) are independent and uniformly distributed in {0, 
. Finally, since there are up to q SC signcryption queries we add up these bounds to obtain:
and therefore: 
= q H R queries, and has success probability
Stage 2. We will use the "forking technique" [14, 27, 23 ] to perform the "Stage 2" reduction between GDL' and GDL. In the analysis of this stage we will use the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2 (Splitting Lemma [23] ) Let a and b denote independent random variables over finite sets A and B, respectively, with probability distribution functions P A (.) and P B (.), respectively. Let
Then there exists a 'good' subset G of S such that:
Proof. Let us define the good set G to be the set of all (a , b 
Proof. We have
Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we have 
Proof. On input (g, p, q, g a ), our GDL algorithm A GDL works as follows. a, b) ∈ G i , the probability that (a, b) ∈ S i over a random choice of b in B i is also at least p i /2. Hence, the probability that the outcome (a, b) of the first run of A GDL in our algorithm is in G i is at least p i /2, and then for each of those outcomes, the probability over the random choice of b = ( r[i] 
},
and since p i is the probability that a run of A GDL is i-successful, we know that
, we apply Lemma 3 to get the desired lower bound on A GDL 's success probability:
To complete the proof of the theorem, we compose the reductions from "Stage 1" and "Stage 2" and convert A UF into the desired algorithm A GDL with the resources claimed in the theorem statement and success probability satisfying the bound The claimed insecurity bound of the theorem now follows by taking a maximum over all adversaries with the appropriate resource parameters.
We remark here that the above result is optimal in the sense that the GDL assumption is also necessary for the scheme ZSCR to achieve FSO-UF-CMA. If an efficient algorithm for the GDL problem is available, it can be used to efficiently compute the sender's secret key from his public key, by using the sender's flexible signcryption oracle to simulate the answers to the GDL algorithm's DDH queries. We refer the reader to [26] for the details of this attack.
Concluding Remarks
We have proved the confidentiality of Zheng's original signcryption scheme with respect to a strong and well defined security notion that we introduced and called "FSO/FUO-IND-CCA2". Although this notion bears some similarities to the well known "IND-CCA2" notion defined for standard public-key encryption schemes, it is stronger than the direct adaptation of "IND-CCA2" to the setting of signcryption, since we allow an attacker to query both the signcryption oracle and the unsigncryption oracle in a flexible way. We have also introduced a strong unforgeability notion called "FSO-UF-CMA" which allows an forger to query the signcryption oracle in a flexible way. We have successfully proved the unforgeability of Zheng's original signcryption with respect to this notion.
We emphasize here that our security models for signcryption are applicable not only to Zheng's original scheme but also to other various signcryption schemes: As mentioned earlier in this paper, Zheng's SDSS2-type signcryption scheme described in [34, 35] can be proven to be secure relative to the same computational assumptions for the SDSS1-type signcryption scheme using the same proof techniques presented in this paper. Another immediate consequence of the results of this work is the provable confidentiality and unforgeability of the elliptic curve variants of Zheng's original signcryption scheme described in [37] . The only difference is that we need to rely on elliptic curve equivalent GDH and GDL assumptions in proving the security of the elliptic curve variants. It should also be noted that all these schemes require the use of two separate hash oracles, one in generating τ which acts as an encryption key for a message m and the other in obtaining r which participates in the generation of a signature.
